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Assignment of lease between lessees as joint tenants-is lessor’s consent required? 
Context 
The decision of Lockrey v Historic Houses Trust of New South Wales [2012] NSWSC 654  raises an 
interesting issue about the necessity of seeking the consent of the lessor where there is an 
assignment of a lease between joint tenants who already hold the lease when one joint tenant sells 
the business operated on the leased premises to the other joint tenant. A secondary issue raised by 
the proceedings concerns whether the lessor’s consent was unreasonably withheld under the 
processes under Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) (“the Act”) upon the grounds of  lack of provision of 
information as to the remaining lessee’s financial standing. 
Facts 
 A cafe in the Sydney CBD was leased by HHT for 5 years  from 2007 to L and S as joint tenants .In 
2009,S entered into a contract with L to sell his share of the business to L  for about $355,000 
subject to “the landlord having provided consent to the transfer of the vendor of his interest in the 
lease to the purchaser”. There was also a provision in the contract of sale of the business by which L 
warranted the he had “made an application to the Landlord to have the Vendor released from all 
obligations ...pursuant to the lease” and “until released the Purchaser agreed to indemnify the 
Vendor against any liability under the lease”. The principal liability appeared to be rental arrears of 
approximately $130,000 at the date of the request for consent to the assignment. In response to the 
request, HHT indicated that it was “unwilling to consent to the assignment” until it was provided  
with “verifiable information regarding L’s financial standing”.  
Analysis 
Was there an assignment? 
L argued that   the assignment to S was not an assignment within the meaning of the lease or the Act 
but a release by one joint tenant and therefore consent was not required under the lease nor did the 
provisions of s 39 and 41 become relevant. The argument ran that as each joint tenant was seized of 
the whole estate or interest there was nothing to assign. Particular reliance was placed by L upon 
the House of Lords decision of Burton v Camden London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399 where 
Lord Millett (dissenting) ,in dictum, suggested exactly that proposition. However, the majority found 
that a release by one joint tenant of an interest in a lease was an assignment for the purposes of 
certain legislation which prohibited assignment. Lord Nicholls, for the majority,    found that this 
argument was too nuanced for this purpose and that any change in the identity of the lessees would 
amount in practical terms to an assignment of the lease. This would be the situation His Lordship 
said, whether the co owners of the lease held as joint tenants or tenants in common. 
In essence, therefore, consent was required, a fact that must have originally occurred to S and L as 
consent had been sought and refused. Stevenson J then dealt with the efficacy of the refusal of 
consent under the lease and the Act. 
“reasonable withholding of consent” 
A clause in the lease, permitting assignment with the consent of the lessor, was a  modified mirror of 
Sections 39 and 41 of the Retail Leases Act 1994(NSW) to which it was subject. A clause in the Lease 
permitted the withholding of consent on the grounds that the proposed assignee had “  financial 
resources, business experience, retailing , or restauranting skills inferior to those of the (assignor)”[s. 
39(1)(b) of the Retail Leases Act 1994].There was a further provision in the lease which mirrored s 
41(a) of the Act which provided that ,with the request for assignment, the assignor must provide the 
lessor with “such information as the lessor may reasonably require concerning the financial standing 
and business experience of the proposed assignee”.If after this information had been supplied, s 
41(d) of the Act(replicated in the lease) deemed consent to have been given. 
Stevenson J found that, given the circumstances of the arrears, notwithstanding that L was already a 
co lessee, that it was reasonable for HWT to seek further information as to the financial standing of L 
which information was never supplied[57].Therefore ,consent could not have been “deemed” to 
have been given pursuant to s 41(d) of the Act. 
Conclusion 
It is respectfully submitted that, despite the clever argument advanced by L ,this decision is clearly 
correct. A change in the identity of the lessees is a change in the legal personality of the persons to 
whom the lease has been granted and has significant financial and other ramifications for a lessor. 
The fact that a change of this nature arranged between the lessees may have “released” one of the 
joint tenants from liability under the lease was wishful thinking at its best as there was still privity of 
contract between the lessor and the both lessees and liability under that contract would have had to 
be expressly discharged by agreement supported by consideration. The situation here was 
exacerbated by the fact that the lessees were jointly and severally liable for the arrears and S could 
not effortlessly exit this liability (if this had been contemplated) by being released as a retiring joint 
tenant. This decision is in line with the principles expressed in other decisions as to what amounts to 
an assignment or a parting of possession (Lam Kee Ying v Lam Shes Tong [1975] AC 247) where there 
is effectively a change of legal personality in the lessee, or indeed, from a practical point of view ,a 
change of control over the lessee. The provision giving qualified consent to assignment is meant to 
catch any such changes regardless of the nature of the holding of the lessees. 
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